We consider a situation of duopolistic competition in the press industry, involving two editors competing in both the newspapers' and advertising markets. The population of readers in this market is differentiated in terms of their attitudes toward advertising; some of them are assumed to be advertising-lovers, while the remaining ones are assumed to be advertisingaverse. We analyse a two-period sequential game whose players are the editors each selling a magazine of different political content. The editors also sell some proportion of their newspaper's surface as advertising support for the products sold by the advertisers. In the first stage of the game, editors select the newsstand price of their magazine and, in the second stage, the advertising tariff they oppose to the advertisers. We identify the equilibrium of this sequential game and examine how it depends on the proportion of ad-lovers and ad-avoiders' readers and on the intensity of their attraction-repulsion feelings for advertising.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Sonnac (2000) has studied the influence of readers' attitudes toward press advertising on the pricing behavior of a newspaper's editor who is a monopolist both in the press industry and in the advertising market. She starts from the observation that the editor sells, in fact, two different products to the readers. On the one hand he provides them with the editorial content (news, entertainment, TV-programs...) of the newspaper and, on the other hand, he delivers them simultaneously its advertising content. The basic assumption underlying her analysis is that, while the editorial content is perceived as a good by the readership, the advertising content is viewed as a bad : the larger the newspaper's surface devoted to advertising, the higher the number of potential readers who prefer, at a given price, to refrain from buying the newspaper. Consequently, when the monopolist increases his sales in the advertising market, increasing thereby his advertising revenue, he reduces simultaneously his sales at the newsstand, decreasing thereby his editorial revenue. Sonnac identifies the optimal pricing policy in each of the two markets, taking into account the above interaction. In the present paper we extend her approach in two directions. First we consider a situation of duopolistic competition, with two editors competing in both the newspapers' and advertising markets. Second, we allow the population of readers to be differentiated in terms of their attitudes toward advertising; some of them are assumed to be advertising-lovers, while the remaining ones are assumed to be advertising-averse.
It is generally recognised that the attitude of media consumers toward advertising cannot be clearly ascertained. While it is widely accepted that TV-viewers are reluctant to advertising 1 , judgements about readers' attitudes toward press advertising seem to be more ambiguous. Some scholars think that advertising could foster the circulation of newspapers while others believe that it slows it down. Furthermore, it seems that consumers' feelings about press advertising are country specific. Some American scholars insist on the positive effect of press advertising on circulation because "to the extent that this information is valuable to consumers, increases in advertising 1 The hypothesis of advertising aversion has been empirically studied, among others, by Brown and Rothschild,1993 ,Danaher,1995 ,Dukes,2000 ,Ha,1996 ,Kent, 1993 , Ray and Webb, 1986 , Solomon, 1997 ,and Zhou, 2000 . This assumption has also been used in theoretical models (see, for instance, Anderson and Coate, 2000 , Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac, 1999 and Nielsen and Sörgard, 2000 .
will increase the demand for the newspaper at any given price" (Blair and Romano, 1993, p. 722 ). This view is supported by empirical analysis of the American press industry (see Rosse, 1980 , Bogart, 1989 ). This viewpoint is also confirmed when applied to retail advertising whose content is purely informational (Lorimor, 1977 and Ferguson, 1983) . On the contrary, in Europe, the newspapers' readership seems to be more reluctant to commercial advertising. Advertising is often regarded as polluting the main raison d'êtreof the press which is to inform its readers about news, and not about commercial matters. A study performed by the Gfk institute, refered to by Musnick (1999), about consumers' reactions to advertising reveals that among 15 EC countries, for all media supports, most consumers are ad-avoiders. This study shows that, with the exception of British citizens, who seem to accept advertising without reluctance, 80 % of Germans and Spaniards are averse to advertising, whereas French citizens are openly hostile. Another study, refered to by Musnick (1999) again, examines ad-avoidance for six media in five different European countries (see Table 1 ). This study confirms that advertising avoidance affects each of these countries and each of these media, even if this avoidance differs from country to country. There are various reasons which can be evoked to explain the diversity of consumers' behavior toward advertising. Undoubtedly, the diversity across regions, like between the United States and Europe, finds its origin in basic cultural discrepancies : while it is often viewed as a significant sign of materialism on the Old Continent, the promotion of consumption products by advertisers is generally perceived more positively on the other side of the Atlantic. But, even in the same country, individuals disagree on the virtues and defects of advertising. Some argue that it should be viewed as a good since it allows consumers to be better informed about the existence of the products, their prices and respective qualities. Sometimes also persuasive advertising is praised up since it would generate more consumption willingness in the population, promoting thereby industrial and commercial activities at the macroeconomic level. Furthermore, advertising is often viewed as an art on its own, so much talentuous the artists who invest in its creation. Yet, for others, advertising is a bad. It is perceived as harmful because, even if it may provide useful information on products, nothing guarantees that this information is not untrue or illusory. For the supporters of this view, advertising is perceived as particularly noxious when its objective is mainly persuasive. Persuasive advertisers would deprive individuals of their freedom of judgment, by using tricks and artefacts in order to convince them that they could not live without consuming the goods which advertisers are praising up. Moreover, being spread in the population through the media supports, advertising is likely to alter their content and the conditions under which these media are consumed (see Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2000)).
In conclusion, it seems that the effective readership of the press industry is made of a mixture of consumers who, for some of them, share a positive perception of press advertising while the remaining ones support the opposite view. Of course, the proportion of ad-lovers and ad-averse readers varies from country to country, as revealed for instance by table 2 provided above. Most probably, psychological introspection would also reveal that the intensity of the attraction, or repulsion feelings of readers is also influenced by the particular cultural habits of each specific country. This is the reason why we have developed the ensuing model of press competition around two main parameters. The first one describes the proportion of ad-lovers and ad-avoiders existing in the population of readers. The second parameter represents the intensity of ad-repulsion or ad-attraction feelings of these readers.
We analyse a two-stage game whose players are the editors each selling a magazine of different political content. They face a population of readers which differ from each other by their political opinions and by their feelings about commercial advertising. The editors also sell some proportion of their magazine's surface as advertising support for the products sold by the advertisers. In the first stage of the game, they select the price for their magazine and, in the second stage, the advertising tariff they oppose to the advertisers. We identify the equilibria of this sequential game and examine how they depend on the main parameters of the analysis identified above: the proportion of ad-lovers and ad-avoiders' readers and the intensity of their attraction-repulsion feelings for advertising. The model and the equilibrium analysis are developed in section 2. A short conclusion discusses the similarities between our approach of the media market and the literature on network externalities. 
Equilibrium analysis
Consider two editors producing differentiated magazines(for instance, magazines of different political opinion) to a population of readers ranked, between the political opinions expressed in the news from the left to the right on the political spectrum [0, 1]. News magazine 1 is located on this spectrum at point 0, while editor 2 is located at point 1. Editors also sell some proportion of their news's surface to advertisers who buy it to promote the sales of their products. At each point t of the unit interval [0, 1] ,there corresponds a continuum [0, 1] of readers, with a proportion γ of them being advertisingavoiders and a proportion 1 − γ being advertising-lovers. By this we mean that the advertising-avoiders (resp. lovers) loose (resp. gain) in utility when the surface devoted to advertising spots increases : the larger the surface of a magazine sold to advertisers, the larger the loss (resp. gain) in utility incurred when reading that news. More precisely, for a reader located at a distance t (resp. 1−t) of the left magazine who belongs to the proportion γ of advertising-avoiders, total loss in utility when buying this news is measured by
(total loss in utility when buying magazine 2 : (1 − t) 2 + βx 2 + p 2 ), when editor 1 (resp. editor 2) quotes a price p 1 (resp. p 2 ) for his magazine and sells a proportion x 1 (resp. x 2 ) of it to advertisers. Similarly, for a reader located at a distance t (resp. 1 − t) of the left news who belongs to the proportion 1 − γ of advertising-lovers, total loss in utility when buying this news is now measured by
(total loss in utility when buying magazine 2 : (1 − t) 2 − βx 2 + p 2 ), when editor 1 (resp. editor 2) quotes a price p 1 (resp. p 2 ) and sells a proportion x 1 (resp. x 2 ) of the news' s surface to advertisers. Consequently, the reader t α for which the equality
holds, ie
separates those types of ad-avoiders who buy their magazine from editor 1 from those who buy it from editor 2. Similarly, the reader t λ for which the equality
holds, i.e.
separates those types of ad-lovers who buy their news from editor 1 from those who buy it from editor 2. We observe that
: buy newspaper 1 : buy newspaper 2
The parameter β measures the intensity of ad-attraction when a reader is adlover while it measures his intensity of ad-repulsion when he is ad-averse. 3 .
Assume x 1 > x 2 . Then t α ≤ t λ : all readers at the left of t α buy news 1, whether being ad-avoiders or ad-lovers; all those at the right of 1 − t λ buy from editor 2, while those between t α and t λ who are ad-lovers buy news 1 and those who are ad-avoiders buy in this sub-interval magazine 2. Accordingly, the corresponding demand functions in the newsstand sales market are, respectively, for editor 1
and
for editor 2. When x 2 > x 1 , we have t α = t λ and we obtain, similarly
The difference (x 1 − x 2 ) in the advertising volume, whether positive or negative, plays a crucial role in the determination of demand in the newsstand sales market : at equal prices, the editor with the larger advertising volume benefits from a larger demand in the market if, and only if, 1 2 > γ, that is, if and only if, the majority of the readership's population is ad-lover. We denote by s 1 and s 2 the unit price of an inset opposed to advertisers by editor 1 and editor 2, respectively. The population of advertisers is represented by the unit interval [0, 1]; they are ranked in this interval by order of increasing willingness to pay for an inset. Each advertiser θ, θ ∈ [0, 1], buys an inset in one of the two news magazines, at the exclusion of the other (insets are indivisible). We assume that the utility of advertiser θ depends on the size of the readership of each news: the utility of the inset in magazine i increases proportionately with the size of the readership. More precisely, we suppose that the utility of buying an inset in magazine i at a tariff s i is given by
where D i corresponds to the total readership of editor i, as it follows from the market share D i = D i (p 1 , p 2 ) obtained in the newsstand sales market. The constant U • is assumed to be sufficiently large to guarantee that, for all advertising tariffs s i , i = 1, 2, the advertising market is covered. Consequently, if a proportion x 1 of the advertisers' population buys the insets in the left magazine and x 2 in the right one, with x 1 > x 2 and x 1 + x 2 = 1, editors' revenues write as
for editor 1, and
for editor 2, respectively. Similarly, when x 2 > x 1 , we obtain
for editor 2. In order to solve the problem of determining magazines' prices at the newsstand, as well as advertising prices, we consider a two-period sequential game played between the editors. In period 1, they select newsstand prices p 1 
Taking into account the fact that the market is covered, the advertising demand functions in the second period are then given by
for editor 2. When D 2 > D 1 , these demand functions have to be reversed since editor 2 is now market leader in the advertising market, namely
for editor 1 and
for editor 2. The resulting payoffs V i in the second-period game are accordingly
when D 1 > D 2 , and
when
We define an equilibrium for the above two-period game in the following way. An equilibrium is a pair of strategies [p * 
is an equilibrium in the second-period game with payoffs given by (5) or (6) 
tations are fulfilled at equilibrium in the second period).
To describe the equilibria of the above two-period game, assume first that x a 1 −x a 2 > 0 (a similar description could be carried out when x a 1 −x a 2 < 0). This assumption implies that editors' payoffs in the first period game are given by (3) with
To be an equilibrium, first order conditions require
which hold if, and only if
Substituting these values in (3) we get
Accordingly, given expectations x
In that case, entering in period 2, advertisers observe D 1 > D 2 . Consequently, editors' payoffs in the advertising market opening in period 2 are given by (5) . For an equilibrium, first-order conditions require
leading to equilibrium advertising prices in the second-stage game
to which correspond market shares
Since x * 1 − x * 2 > 0, the payoffs in the first stage game obtain from expressions (1) and (2). Substituting the above values for x i in (7) we obtain
Accordingly, when expectations about advertising volumes satisfy (8) into account, the strategies defined by (10) and (9) form an equilibrium if, and only if, γ < 1 2 , that is, when the majority of the population is ad-lover. A similar analysis carried out under the assumption that x 
in the newsstand sales market. Then, in the advertising market, all advertisers are indifferent between buying an inset from editor 1 or from editor 2. This entails Bertrand competition in the advertising market which, in turn, yields equilibrium advertising tariffs s * 1 = s * 2 = 0. This argument is also valid when γ > 1 2 . Thus we conclude:
), there exist three equilibria, one symmetric and two asymmetric; under ad-repulsion (γ > 1 2 ), only the symmetric equilibrium survives.
Conclusion
This article has raised the question of how readers' feelings about press advertising affects price competition between newspapers' editors when they are rivals both in the press and the advertising markets. It appears that the nature of their rivalry is significantly influenced by these feelings : when there is a majority of ad-lovers, two asymmetric equilibria exist, which mirror each other, with one of the rivals being leader on the advertising market. When the population is in majority ad-averse, these asymmetric equilibria disappear and only the symmetric one survives.
There are close similarities between the problem which we study in this paper and the questions which are at the heart of the literature which deals with goods for which consumers' preferences depends on the clientele size There is a wide body of literature on network goods (see Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a recent survey) but also a strand of literature on situations when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity (see for instance the recent paper by Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001)). In our framework the utility which readers derive from reading their favorite newspaper depends, positively or negatively, on the number of advertisers which choose this specific media for advertising purposes while, on the other hand, the profit which advertisers may reach by putting an ad in a given journal is increasing in the number of readers. Things are here more complicated than in the literature we referred above since there are two distinct clienteles and accordingly each media has to set two prices instead of one. However the problems and the techniques for solving them are quite similar since, given the prices set by the firms, the decisions of the consumers are interdependent, i.e. the decision of a particular reader of buying some newspaper (resp. the decision of a particular advertiser of placing an ad in some journal) depends on (is a best reply to) the decisions which are taken by the advertisers (resp. by the readers).
Similarities are quite obvious when one looks at the assumption which we make in this paper according to which firms' pricing decisions in the readers' market are based upon expected advertising market shares. This assumption basically means that newspapers' prices are revised infinitely faster than expectations and is the counterpart in our framework of the assumption encountered in the literature on networks that firms' strategic decisions are made for given expectations on the firms' clienteles. It allows to avoid the difficulties encountered with the opposite assumption and which we have already outlined. Not surprisingly there is also some similarities between the results. For instance in the case of "conformity", i.e. positive network externalities, Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) obtain fiercer competition and asymmetric equilibria with the possible eviction of the small firm while under "vanity", i.e. negative network externalities, price competition is relaxed and the equilibria are more symmetric.
